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In Re:

THE SUPRE:·lE COUHT OF TllE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT l3. HANSEl-J
No. 15605

Disciplinary Proceeding
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Robert B. Hansen, Appellant, was charged in a complaint
before the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar with
four counts of unprofessional conduct, each count relating to
legal work done by him for a particular client.
DISPOSITION BY THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
After a two-day hearing, the Hearing Examiners entered cooclusionary type findings to the effect that Appellant had, as
to three of the four counts, violated specified canons of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.

On the Fourth Count, dealing

with legal work done for one James Dick and one John R. Dick,
the conclusionary findings entered by the Hearing Examiners
are negative in tone, but the Examiners concluded that the acts
noted in their findings did not violate the Rules of Professior:
Conduct, nor the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The recommen-

dation made by the Hearing Examiners was that Appellant be
suspended for one year, and that the Board of Bar Comr.1issioner'
adopt and approve the recommendations and forward the finding:;
and the recommendation to the Utah Suµreme Court.
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The Board of Bar Commissioners entered an order dated
January 6, 1978, adopting the findings of the Hearing Examiners
and recommending to the Supreme Court that Appellant be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. 1

1. We believe that it is important to note at this point that
the Board of Bar Commissioners did not have a transcript of
the evidence available to it.

Its order was entered January

6th, and the court reporter completed and certified the transcript on January 18, 1978.

The recommendation of the Bar

Commissioners, which is an essential step in this disciplinary
proceeding, was thus based entirely on the conclusionary findings of the Hearing Examiners.
any of the specifics.

These findings are devoid of

Even if the Board of Bar Commissioners

was willing, without knowing any of the details or specifics,
to accept the conclusion that the Appellant was guilty of
unprofessional conduct, the Board, nevertheless, surely needed
to know the details before it could determine whether the
recommended one-year suspension was appropriate.

It did not

have these details, because the transcript of the evidence was
not available, and the findings of the Hearing Examiners are
mere conclusionary statements and are not even useful in
determining the details and circumstances of the claimed
violations.
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THE

Nf\'l'URE OF 'l'l!E

RELIEF

SOUGHT

Appellant, by this proceeding, urges the court to set

as~

some of the negative findings on the grounds that they do not
fairly reflect the evidence, and that the court note the mitigating circumstances which are shown by the evidence, but
ignored in the findings.

We urge the court to reject the

recommendation for a one-year suspension.
STATEMENT

OF

FACTS AND ARGUMENT

We believe that we can most effectively present this
matter by (a) noting, as to each of the four counts, the specific allegations of the complaint;

(b)

setting forth the parti-

cular canons of Professional Conduct referred to in the complaint;

(c) referring to the applicable findings;

(d) detail-

ing the evidence and noting wherein we believe the findings
are either contrary to or do not fairly reflect the evidence;
and (e) arguing the facts.
We object to the findings in three basic particulars.
First, because of the conclusionary form of the findings the
Hearing Examiners really didn't deal with several specific
evidentiary disputes.

Second, there are no findings at all

concerning mitigating circumstances.

Third, we submit that

so~:

of the findings really do not accurately or fairly reflect the
evidence.

With this explanation as to the manner in which we

propose to proceed, we turn to the specific counts of the
complaint, which we have elected to discuss in inverse order.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(a).

COUNT IV OF COMPLAINT:
THE LEGAL
WORK PERFORMED FOR JOHN R. DICK
AND Jfu\\E:S DICK.
THE FINDINGS ARE
CONTRARY TO THE TESTIMONY AND THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN CRITICAL
ASPECTS, DO NOT ADDRESS THE FACTUAL
ALLEGATI01'S, AHE UNFAIR OVERALL AND ItWICATE
A GENERAL LACK OF CAREFUL ATTENTION THAT
SHOULD BE GIVEN FHlDINGS IN A DISCIPLit<ARY
PROCEEDING.

The Charge.

The complaint charges that Appellant

undertook to represent John R.

Dick and James Dick in the pur-

chase of real property from American National Mortgage Co.

It

asserts in paragraph 1 that l\merican National did not hold title,
and that this was a fact which Appellant did not ascertain.
Paragraph 2 alleges that title to the property being sold was
held by a third party named Soelberg.

It next alleges that

subsequent litigation instituted by Appellant in the names of
John R. and James Dick resulted in American National obtaining
a "judgment" on its "counterclaim" against John R. Dick in
the sum of $1,341.65.

Paragraph 4 then alleges that the Dicks

assert that they did not have knowledge of, did not consent
to or in any way authorize Appellant to institute the litigation in their names;

that they were unaware of the judgment

until a subsequent title report revealed it, and that the judgment constituted a lien on the real property owned by the Dicks.
Paragraph 6 asserts that Appellant was the real party in interest
in the litigation.

It is then charged that his conduct vio-

lated Rule IV, Canon 1, DR 1-102

(4),

(5),

(6), and Canon 5,

DR 5-103 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State
Bar, and the provisions of Rule 17(a) and Rule 11 of the URCP.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(bl

'l'he Canons.

For the convenience of the court we next

set forth the rules of conduct referred to in this charqe.

n

are as follows:
Rule IV Canon 1, DR 1-102 Misconduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Rule IV Canon 5, DR 5-103 Avoiding Acquisition of
Interest in Litigation
(A) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest
in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he
may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee
or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
(B) While representing a client in connection with contemplating or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not
advance or guarantee financial assistance to his
client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee
the expenses of litigation, including court costs,
expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately lia~le
for such expenses.
Rule 17 (a) requires an action to be brought in the name o;
the real party in interest, and Rule 11 requires the attorney
to sign the pleadings, and states that the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read tile
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pleading; that there is "good ground'' to support it, etc.
(c) The Findings and Decision.

The Hearing Examiners con-

cluded that the conduct of Appellant in representing John and
James Dick did not violate either the specified Canons nor the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which are cited, yet in Finding
No. 7 they made a series of findings which are negative in
tone, and are not consistent with the evidence.

Further, the

findings really don't address the charges made in the complaint,
nor the specific evidence offerred.

We submit that on this

count Appellant is entitled to be exonerated and to have express findings that he did not commit the wrongs with which he
was charged.

We thus turn to the evidence.

(d) The Evidence.

The opening statement on the Dick matter

made by Mr. Stark, representing the Utah State Bar, follows the
complaint (R. 12-15).

There is no serious conflict in the test-

imony of Appellant on the one hand and John R. and James Dick
on the other.

Neither John R. Dick nor James Dick appeared

personally, but it was stipulated (R.223) that the testimony
each gave in his deposition could be used.
The uncontradicted evidence shows that Appellant did undertake to represent the Dicks in the purchase of certain real
property (R.225,351, John Dick Dep. 9,10, James Dick Dep. 5).
The first assertion made in the complaint and in the opening
statement by Mr. Sta~ was that Appellant did not ascertain the
outstanding interest of Mr. Soelberg.
wrong.

On this they are simply

Appellant testified (R.434) that he had a title report,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contract itself, wherein the Dicks were the

p~rchciscrs,

and

American Nationol Mortgage Co. ·..1as ti1e seller, ,,;cis i:-itroducec
in evidence as Ex. 49.

Paragrci;)h 6 of that contract

expressl~·

states:
"It is understood that there prL'scntly exists a~
obligation against said property in fa~or of Le~o~
Soelberg, Sr. and Jean E. Soelbcrg, with an unpaid
balance of $3,600 as of i>1y lS, 1965."
Further, John R.

Dick testified thal AppL'llant told then that

Soelbergs had an interest

(Dep.

p.10).

John Dick \,•as asked i"

i1e kne..: Mr. Soelberg \·:as the seller of the property to .h..-:-.eric2:
National Mortgage, and he testified:
\~e

here.

"I think it so stipulatec

knc·...· that he had some interest", and he explained tho

Appellant had so advised them (Dep. p.10).
the complaint and Finding 7(b)

Thus, the charge i:

that Appellant did not ascerta:.

the identity of the fee owner is simply wrong and contrary to
the undisputed evidence.

The finding criticizes the Appellant

where no criticism is warranted.
The Appellant did not ascertain that the Dicks
paying $600 a year

~ere

only

(Ex. 49), whereas American National l-iortc;aqe

was obligated to pay Soelberg $1,000 per year

(R.373).

This

was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Dick v
American National Mortgage Co., 29 Ut.2d 404,
(1973).

510 P.2d 1906

There this court noted that the Dicks had agreed to

pay $5,700 for the property, and that after the
they were to pay $SO per month.

do~n

The court notcJ lhc.?
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in the amount of $3,600 owed to Soelberg noted in paragraph 6
of the real estate contract prepared by Appellant (Ex.49).
American i-Ja ti on al had not paid Soelberg, and was in its allowed
grace period.

Appellant brought suit, because American National

had not paid, and the majority of the Utah Supreme Court held
that in paying Soelberg Appellant was a volunteer.

Mr. Justice

Ellett dissented, stating that the Dicks did not need to wait
until the grace period had expired, and thus risk losing the
property.

In any event, this court held that American National

Mortgage could legally agree to sell the property with an annual
payment of $600, even though it had an annual obligation to
Soelberg of $1,000 (Ex.44).
Apparently American Hational Mortgage did not make a payment to Soelberg, and he went to James Dick and complained
(Dep. p.9).

The Dicks complained to Appellant, and he agreed

to save them harmless from any loss they might suffer by reason
of Soelberg not being paid, and specifically agreed that he
would pay American National Mortgage the difference between the
$600 that the Dicks were oblig.;_ted to pay to American National
and the $1,000 it owed to Soelberg, and he did so.

(R.353).

This is erroneously charged as being an improper purchase of an
interest in litigation.

It is, of course, no such thing, and

the Hearing Examiners should have expressly so found.
The next charge in the complaint is that the Dicks assert
that they did not have knowledge of, consent to, or in any way
authorize Appellant to institute the litigation, for or on
their behalf
inQuinney
their
names
(see provided
Count
4, paragraph
4).
Sponsored or
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-9There was considerable evidence introduced in regard to this
charge, but there is no finding on it.

'l'he Hearing Examiners

merely found that Appellant undertook to prosecute litigation
in the District Court, and

a~

appeal to the Supreme Court,

but are silent as to whether the Dicks knew the suit was filed,
Again we assert that the Appellant should have been total;
absolved by an express finding that the Dicks did know of and
acquiesce in the suit.
evidence.

There really is no dispute in the

The complaint is in evidence as Ex. 38.

September 12, 1967.

It was filE

It shows that John R. and James Dick are

the plaintiffs.
When the deposition of John R. Dick was taken, he admitted
(p.16) that Appellant told him that a suit against Soelberg
would be necessary.

He was asked when he became aware that

Appellant had brought the suit "on behalf of you and your fathe.
against American National Mortgage, and he answered,

"during

the period of negotiations with Soelberg, Bob indicated that
legal action would have to be taken of some nature ... lle then
filed it in our names"

(p.16).

He admitted that a demand

letter threatening suit, dated October 13, 1966, had been sent
by Appellant, and Mr. Dick said that he assumed that he had
received a copy of it about the date it bears, because it was
contained in Mr. Dick's file.

A copy of the complaint dated

September 12, 1967, showing the plaintiffs to be James Dick an:
John R. Dick was produced from Mr. Dick's files, and Mr. Dick

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10testified (Dep. 18-19) that the handwriting on the complaint
"Sept. 1967" was his handwriting, and that he would assume that
that is the date he received it, and that it was fair to say
that by September of 1967 he knew that Appellant had commenced
a lawsuit in the name of Mr. Dick and his father.

When they

paid off the contract, the Dicks said they didn't want anything
more to do with it, and Appellant told them that they would need
to coperate in the lawsuit (Dep.21).

Thereafter, in May of

1971, they saw some interrogatories in the lawsuit bearing
their own names (Dep.23).
these same matters.

James Dick was interrogated about

Basically he could not remember (Dep.27),

but he doesn't contradict the testimony of John R. Dick.
Appellant testified clearly that by sending the demand
letter (R.356) and the complaint and the answer (R.436) to the
Dicks, they were advised of the lawsuit (R.436).

He discussed

the suit with them while it was pending (R.357).

He also told

the Dicks that they would have to help with evidence, and that
they did furnish needed evidence (R.436).

He also testified

that the Dicks had advanced some of the money to pay Soelberg
and had a financial interest in the lawsuit when he filed it.
(R.432).

This is confirmed by John R. Dick, who testified that

when Soelberg first told them that he was not being paid,
they prepaid $600 (Dep. 13).

This payment relates to and

rebuts the charge that the Dicks were not the real parties in
interest.
Thus, the charge made in the complaint that the suit was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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filed without the knowledg8 or consent of the Dicks is
to the uncontradicted evidence.

contrar~

Appellant was entitled to an

express finding that the Dicks knew he had filed the lawsuit
in their names.
The next assertion made in the complaint on the Dick matte:
is that a "judgment" was

enterc~d

on "the counterclaim" in the

sum of $1341.65 (Count Four, p.3).
was no judgment entered on th0

As a matter of fact, there

counterclai~

for $1,341.65.

Wh~

this court affirmed the lov.'er court it ordered (Ex. 44), "Respondent is entitled to its costs."

The attorney for American

National Mortgage then filed a cost bill, which included
$1227 in attorney fees.

(Ex. 38).

so~'

No court had awarded attornc1·

fees in the amount of $1227 or any other amount.
filed a motion to tax costs (R.356).

Appellant

Opposing counsel got a

continuance (R.358), and the matter was not pressed by either
(R.358).

The case was decided in the Utah Supreme Court in

June of 1973 (Ex.44).

In the Fall of 1976, immediately before

the Election, one of the Dicks was involved in a divorce

procc~

ing, and a title report showing the cost bill for some $1,341
was developed (R.358).

Mr. Petty called Appellant, and Appell-

ant told him that there was no judgment (R.248, 360).

Appellan:

said that he could get it cleared up, but Mr. Petty wrote a
letter fixing a deadline, and when it was not met, Mr. Petty
filed a suit and the story was released to the newspaper on
the eve of the election (R.361).

Mr. Petty admits that
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-12Appellant agreed to call up his motion to tax costs (R.255),
but Mr. Petty filed a civil complaint against Appellant on
October 28th (R.253).

Mr. Petty admits that he is the one who

filed the complaint with the Bar (R.260) and that he did this
of his own volition, not on behalf of the Dicks (R.260) and
James Dick testified that he would not have wanted to complain
to the Bar (Dep.40).
This matter was ultimately resolved by Appellant calling
the motion to tax costs on for hearing.

The court disallowed

attorney fees, and costs were taxed at $18, which Appellant
paid

(R.256,362).
There is testimony to the effect that Mr. Dick paid some

attorney a fee

(not to Appellant) of $1,100 to get this item

cleared up (Dep.37).

This was referred to by Mr. Stark in

his opening statement to the hearing examiners (R.15).

If any

attorney charged the Dicks $1,100 to get this cost bill determined by the court, all we can say is that they were very badly
overcharged.
In summary, the complaint charged, and the Hearing Examiners found that the Appellant had not identified the fee owner
(Soelberg).
simply wrong.

The charge was not sustained.

The finding is

The complaint charged that Appellant filed the

suit without the knowledge or consent of the Dicks.
charge was not sustained.
point at all.

The

The findings did not address that

The complaint charged that the action was not

brought in the name of the real party in interest.

That charge

is wro~g.
The findings don't address it. The complaint
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-13charges that as a result of the litigation a "judcrrnent" was
granted on a "counterclaim" for $1,341, and the Hearing
Examiners found that a judgment was entered which clouded the
title. Surely the Appellant was entitled to a finding that the
Supreme Court had awarded costs on appeal, the prevailing
attorney had wrongfully claimed attorney fees, a timely motion
to tax costs was filed, and a judgment was finally entered for
$18 which the Appellant paid.

The conclusionary finding that

he did not violate specified canons is simply not adequate,

a~

the negative findings are not warranted.
POINT II.

COUNT THREE OF COMPLAINT: THE STATE
THE FINDINGS ARE
V PIEPENBURG CASE.
INADEQUATE IN NOT RESOLVING EVIDENTIARY
DISPUTES, IN NOT DETERMINING WHETHER A
C0~1UNITY STANDARD EXISTED AS TO CONFIDENTIAL
DISCLOSURES, AND IF A STANDARD EXISTED, lmAT
THAT STANDARD WAS AND THE FINDINGS ARE IN
ERROR IN CONCLUDING APPELLANT VIOLATED
BAR CANONS.

In Count Three, Appellant is charged with an improper
investigation into the background of prospective jurors in an
obscenity case.

That case also has heretofore reached the

Supreme Court in State v Piepenburg, 571 P.2d 1299.
(a) The Charge.

Part of the alleged misconduct charged

included contacting L.D.S. Bishops in the locality of the specific juror's homes.

The complaint, by referrence to Rule IV,

Canon 7, charged Appellant with a vexatious and harassing
investigation of the jurors (R.222).

It also charged that

Appellant was interviewed by a local television reporter, and
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-14in the interview disclosed the jury investigations and stated
that because of this background information, he was certain
that two of the jurors would hold out for conviction.

It is

alleged that at least two of the jurors selected were advised
prior to the trial that persons associated with the Attorney
General's office had been investigating them, and this, they
charged, violated specific Canons of the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
(b) The Canons.

These canons are again set forth in full

for the convenience of the court:
Rule IV Canon 7
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution
or defense of a criminal matter shall not, from
the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or
indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or
arrest until the commencement of the trial, or
disposition of without trial, make or participate in
making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication and that relates to:
(6) Any opinion as the guilt or innocence of the
accused, the evidence, or the merits of the case.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a
criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm associated with
the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall
not make or participate in making an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication and that
relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial
or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere
with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or
refer without comment to public records of the court
in the case.
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his
employees and associates from making an extrajudicial
statement that he would be prohibited from making
under DR 7-107.
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Rule IV, Canon 7
(E) A lawyer shall not conduct or cause, by financial
support or otherwise, another to conduct a vexatious
or harrassing investigation of either a venireman or
juror.

i

(F) All restrictions imposed by DR 7-108 upon a lawyer als
apply to communications with or investigation of
members of a family of a venireman or a juror.
During the hearing a questio,, was asked of Mr. Wickstrorr,,
one of the attorneys representing the Bar, if what they were
charging was merely the alleged improper interview with the
reporter and he answered, no, that he read the allegations of
Count Three as charging Appellant with making a vexatious and
harrassing investigation of the jurors (R.222).
(c) The Findings and Decision.

The Hearing Examiners

again made conclusionary type findings and arrived at a legal
conclusion that the acts described in paragraph 6 of the
Findings (the background investigation) did not violate the
provisions of Rule IV, Canon 6 DR 7-108

(E) and (F)

(which is

the canon dealing with vexatious and harrassing investigation
of jurors).
The Findings and Decision go on to conclude that Appellant
did violate Rule IV, Canon DR 7-107
(D), but not 7-107

(J).

(B)

(6) and Canon DR 7-107

These, as set forth above, relate to

the making of an extrajudicial statement concerning the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and the making of an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
(d) The Evidence.

We next turn to the evidence.

publish·,·~

In thi'

charge we think there was a dispute as Lo the circumstzmcc"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-lG-

under which some of the statements were made.
not resolved by the findings.

That dispute is

The dispute is between the

testimony of Mr. Horton, who was the television reporter, and
testimony of Appellant.
Appellant readily admitted that he became associated as
counsel in the Piepenburg case (R.363), and that he had used
the resources of the Attorney General's office to make a
background investigation of the potential jurors (R.366).
intended that it be used to make

peremtory

He

challenges (R.367).

There was no personal contact made with any juror at all (R.
365) .

He arranged to have someone from the Attorney General's

office call an L.D.S. Church official or his wife or a neighbor
to see if a prospective juror would likely follow the law and
would be acceptable in a pornography suit (R.366).

The Hearing

Examiners, as noted above, concluded that what he did in
this investigation did not violate the canons of ethics, as
charged by the complaint and we will, therefore, not deal
further with that investigation.
Appellant is found to have been guilty of unprofessional
conduct in regard to an interview that he gave to Mr. Horton.
We first point out to the court that there is a Statement
of Principles and Guidelines for Reporting, duly adopted by
the Utah State Bar and the media organizations, which was introduced in evidence as Ex. 33.

Paragraph 3 of the Principles

provides that:
"No trial should be influenced by the pressure of
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-17publicity or from public clamor.
Lawyers, journalists ...
share the responsibility to prevent the creation of
such pressures."
Appellant testified that he was aware that the Bar and
the Press had adopted the guidelines (R.406).

Ive think that

this is of importance, because an attorney familiar with the
adoption of those guidelines had reason lo assume that journalists would accept dual responsibility under the guidelines.
One of the expert witnesses called by respondent acknowledged
this (R.109-111)

Mr. Horton had not heard of this guideline

(R.152,154).
We next refer to the circumstances under which the statements were made by Appellant to Mr. Horton.

According to the

testimony of both Mr. Hansen and Mr. Horton, the jury had been
impaneled, the court had become concerned about the investigation of the jurors, and a hearing had been held in chambers.
Mr. Horton had been in the courtroom and knew of the court's
concern (R.131 and 371).

After the hearing in chambers, Mr.

Horton wanted to know what had taken place and Appellant said
that the judge was concerned about whether they were actually
contacting jurors.

Appellant said that he had told the judge

that he had not contacted any jurors, and the judge was satisfied that they were only conducting a background investigation,
and not endeavoring to influence how the jurors voted

(R. 371.)

He intended Mr. Horton to publish that interview (R.372-3).
That interview occurred at counsel table.

Mr. Horton tcstifir

that he took notes (R.132).
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-18Appellant testified that he then terminated the interview
by asking if there was anything else Mr. Horton needed,

(R.

373) and Mr. Horton said, no, and they went out to go to lunch.
As they were leaving the building, at the outside door, Mr.
Horton asked another question, preceded with words such as,
"incidentally", or "by the way'', how do you think you did with
the jury.

Appellant answered that because of what he thought

was a pretty good background investigation on five of the eight
jurors, that two of them would be strong enough for a prosecuti0n on a movie that "was this dirty--and I had seen the movie"
that they would not acquit (R.374). It was not his intent that
these remarks be broadcast.
record.

He thought they were off the

The reporter didn't have his recording equipment

with him and was not taking notes

(R.374).

This conversation

was broadcast (Ex.10).
It is at this point that the testimony of Appellant and
the testimony of Mr. Horton are not in harmony, and the findings
do not address the problem, nor resolve the conflict.
We submit that Mr. Horton was not candid at the disciplinary hearing.
(R.131).

He admitted that he was in court all morning

He testified about what Appellant told him (R.132),

said he was taking notes

(R.133), and then he said, "at one

point, I asked him," now that the jury has been selected what
he thought of the outcome, and he indicated that he believed
some jurors would not permit acquittal, and that when this
statement was made, they were at counsel table

(R.133) ·
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-19lie was asked on cross-exumination (R.139)

if there was not

quite a furor about the possibility that a prior interview

wit~

Mr. Deamer might be released to the public, and he said he
wouldn't describe it that way, but did testify that Mr. Deamer
was sufficiently concerned about his int,·rview, that he had
called and gone down to the station to sec it.

Mr. Horton

was asked if that story, which had been aired the night before,
was not one of the problems being addressed by Judge Leary,
he said, "not to my knowledCJC"

(R.139).

a~

Ile was asked if he

inquired of Appellant as to what hu.d happened in chambers, and
he said he might have (R.140).
went into chambers (R.140).

He was there when the attorneys

He was asked what the hearing was

about, and he said he didn't know; that Mr. O'Connell was upset
about something.

He thinks it was because Mr. Horton wanted

to take pictures in the courtroom, and that at that point he
doesn't know what O'Connell had heard about the jury investigation (R.141).

His attention was then directed to a

deposit~

he had given November 2, 1977 (R.141) where he had testified
(R.142) that Mr. O'Connell became aware "of this jury backgrour..
thing.

This issue had come up and he got quite perturbed.

can't remember exactly how he found out.
Mr. Hansen and I talking about it.
into chambers for a few minutes,''

I

He may have overhearG

Anyway, the attorneys went
(R.142).

Mr. Horton on

cross-examination said that his deposition was not correct.
It was the photographs which he had not been permitted to take
and not the jury investigation which made Mr. O'Connell ups•'
(R.142).
wasLawcross-examinec1
atby the
some
about
a 1·:
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-20all we can do is ask the court to read it, beginning at R. 143.
The news release that he actually used on the air was in
harmony with what he said in his deposition, and not in harmony
with what he testified on cross-examination (see Ex. 10).

It

seems contrary to common sense that there would have been a
serious problem about him taking pictures.
to take them.

He asked permission

Permission was denied, and none was taken.

should not have upset anybody but him.

This

But the defense attorney

was very upset, and in Mr. Horton's deposition and in the news
release (Ex.10) which he wrote, Mr. Horton said that Mr.
O'Connell was upset about the jury investigation.
directly contradicts Mr. Horton on this (R.370).

Appellant
Appellant

testified that the interview which he intended to make public,
which had taken place at the counsel table (R.370) and at which
Mr.Horton said he took notes,
investigation.

(R.132) related to the background

That interview ended and they walked out of the

building to the outside door.

It was at this point, according

to Appellant, that the question was asked about how Appellant
thought he came out on the jury (R.374).

On direct examination

Mr. Horton said that this conversation had occurred at counsel
table as a part of the overall interview (R.133).

On cross-

examination, beginning at R.149, he indicated that this may
have occurred when they were walking out the door.

This

difference in the testimony, it seems to us, is quite material
as to whether Appellant should have anticipated that the
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-21statement should have been published, and thus would be a
violation by him of Canon 7, DR 7-107

(B)

(6) and

(D).

Appell-

ant testified unequivocally th:1t he intended the interview at
counsel table to be used.

lie knew he was talking to a reporter.

He can't remember whether the reporter was taking notes (R. 375),
but the reporter said he was (H..132), and they talked about the
background

inve~tigation.

The

h~ariny

examiners concluded

that making the investigation violated no canon, but it is
impossible to tell from the way the findings are set up whether
the examiners thought telling the press about the background
investigation violated the canon.
have been separated.

We submit that these should

Appellant admits that he told the

reporte~

about the background investigation, and said he intended that
to be published (R.425 and 428).

He said that under different

circumstances, as they were walking out of the courthouse
building, he was asked, incidentally, or by the way, how

did~

think he came out, and he said under those circumstances he
thought he was off the record, and made the comment about two
jurors probably holding out for conviction.
that statement to be made public (R.374).
not taking notes (R.375).

He did not intend
The reporter was

Appellant thought that the journal-

ist shared the responsibility with him under the Principles a~
Guidelines (Ex.33) and would not publish it

(R.408).

examiners put these two conversations together

The

(Findings 6(d)I

They do not address the question of whether the statements

\v("

all made at the counsel table, as Mr. Horton first testified,
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-22or whether what to us is the critical statement (about how the
jury would vote) was made under different circumstances, as
they went out the door

(R.374).

The findings are not helpful

on this point--they don't tell us whether the panel

(a) believed

that Mr. Horton was told by Appellant of the judge's concern
about the background investigation of the jury nor (b) whether
the conversation about how the jury might vote and the interview
on the background investigation took place at the counsel table,
or at two different times and places.
We submit that Appellant had the right to rely on the
journalist following the Principles and Guidelines (Ex.33).
The reporter had been in court and knew of the judge's concern
after the conference in chambers.

It thus was not unreasonable

for Appellant to assume that the conversation going out the
front door would not be published.

We further submit that Mr.

Horton was evasive and his testimony was contradictory, and
where there is a conflict between his testimony and Appellant's,
Appellant's should be accepted.
Logic also confirms the credibility of Mr. Hansen's testimony that his predictions regarding the jurors' decision was
not to be broadcast.

It is not reasonable to conclude that

an experienced trial attorney would want a juror to hear
broadcast a statement that one of the prosecuting attorneys
had the juror "in his pocket."

What more offensive statement

could a prosecutor make to a juror who is going to rule on his
case than this statement?
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Finally, we submit that it was error for the hearing
examiners to take testimony at length from the television and
newspaper journalists as to what reporters could be expected
to publish (R.99,100,172,189,206).

That isn't the test, and

we objected to it.
The canon deals with what a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated and the testimony of the journalists as to
what they would do or what reporters would do was not the

iss~.

When they were asked what an attorney would probably think,
they said frankly they didn't know R.199, 210).
The inconsistent testimony of the parade of reporters
called by the prosecution could not establish a community
standard as to lawyers confidential disclosures.

Yet the

findings are silent on this critical issue.
There was no competent testimony concerning a community
standard, other than Ex. 33, which is the Principles and Guidelines.

This puts joint responsibility on the attorney and on

the reporter.

Mr. Horton had been in the courtroom al 1 morning,

and he knew what was going on and what the problem was with the
jury, and it was not unreasonable for Appellant to assume that
he would not broadcast the conversations they had while they
were leaving the outside door after the formal interview was
over and they had walked outside.
We submit the most that can be said of Appellant's conversation under these circumstances is that he made a judgment
error in relying on the principles and Guidelines and what he
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-23aconsidered was the ''off the record" nature of his disclosure.
The courts have not considered a mistake in judgment a basis
for disciplinary action.

State ex rel State Bar Association

v Pinkett (1953), 157 Neb.509, 60 NW 2d 641; In re Mason (1947
Mo. App.) 203 SW 2d 750.
This court has determined that the burden of proof of
persuasion of misconduct should be by clear and convincing
evidence, In re Macfarlane 10 Ut.2d 217, 219; 350 P.2d 631.
Certainly the evidence relied on in this count is not "clear
and convincing."
For the Hearing Examiners to find a violation of the
canon and to recommend suspension of Appellant under these
circumstances is not proper.
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COUNT TIW OF COMPU\INT: THE WINOT'A EMARINE
THE FINDINGS ARE MISLEADING IN
MATTER.
CONCLUDING APPELLANT DID NOT MAINTAIN
COMPLETE AND ADEQUATE RECORDS AND DID
NOT MAINTAIN THE FUNDS IN A SEPARATE
TRUST ACCOU~T, THE FINDINGS ARE INADEQUATE
IN NOT SETTING OUT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES AUD IN ERROR I~ CONCLUDING
A CRIMINAL VIOLATION

Appellant is charged in Count Two with

(a) The Charge.

collecting money for Wino11a Ernarinc_· and fLliling to notify the
client of the receipt of funds;

failing to render a proper

accounting; failing to maintain complete and adequate records;
failing to pay the funds over to his client promptly upon
demand; failing to maintain said funds in a separate trust
account and committing a misdemeanor.
The particular Rules of Professional

(b) The Canons.

Conduct allegedly violated are as follows:
Rule IV, Canon 9
(B) A Lawyer shall:

(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his
funds, securities, or other properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of
a client promptly upon receipt and place them in
a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping
as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities
and other properties of a client coming into the
possession of the lawyer and render appropriate
accounts to his client regarding them.
UCA 78-51-42.

Refusing to pay over money--Penalty.--
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-25An attorney and counselor who receives money or property of his client in the course of his professional
business and who refuses to pay or deliver the same
to the person entitled thereto within a reasonable time
after demand is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) Findings and Decision. The Findings and Decision of
the examiners, again in conclusionary type findings, found
Appellant to be in violation in regard to all of the charges.
We submit that the findings on this count are, at the best,
unfair in the light of the total record.

In regard to the

keeping of accounting records and the deposit of the funds in
the trust account, they are misleading.

Further, the hearing

examiners did not address themselves at all to any findings
regarding mitigating circumstances.
(d) The Evidence.

The material evidence on this count is

as follows:
Appellant did represent Mrs. Emarine in a divorce action
and thereafter in the collection of child support.

The divorce

action was filed in June of 1962 (Ex.40), and until 1966,
payments went directly to her (R.40).

Beginning in 1966,

payments were made to the Clerk of the Court, and released to
Appellant.

He had a power of attorney, authorizing him to cash

the checks (R.40-41), and she got payments from 1966 to 1969
(R. 41).
Appellant was extensively involved in the collection of
commercial accounts.

At the peak of his activity he was

handling approximately 500 accounts, and received approximately
100 payments a month thereon (R.309)
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-26Appellant had a certified

~ublic

accountant set up a

bookeeping system for him, and throughout more than 20 years
of practice he maintained a separate trust account into which
he deposited trust monies (R.371,326).

Both he and his long-

time secretary testified how the system worked.

A receipt book

was kept, and receipts were written as the money came in (R.
325,384).

His bookeeper, Mrs. Pennington, posted all the

receipts to a client ledger card (R.329).

He had two separate

accounts with separate deposit slips, separate account numbers,
and separate checks.

One was a trust account, and the other

was a legal account (R.328,381).

All of the money that came

in found its way into the receipt book (R.329).

If the secre-

tary had a question as to whether it was to be deposited in the
trust account or in the legal account, she put a question mark
on it, and Appellant marked the receipt with a T, if it was
to go into the trust account, and with an L, if it was to go
into the law account (R.311).
those receipts.

Ex. 47A is an example of one of

The collection would include funds for the

client, and it would also include Appellant's attorney fee
(R.329-334).

Mrs. Pennington would post the receipt to the

client's ledger card (R.329).

She prepared a check to remit

the funds to the client but she would hold it for ten days, so
that the check she had received would have time to clear.

At

that point she would notify the client that the money had been
received and that they would remit the funds within ten days
(R.306, 336).

She would then periodically withdraw the

attorney
fees from the trust account and deposit them to the
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-27legal account, and mark her books accordingly (R.330,331).
The system was in effect when she went to work in 1959, and
she was requested to continue it (R.325), and there is no
indication of any problems with the system while he was in the
private practice and maintaining an office and fulltime help
(R.315).
1969

He closed his office and moved to his home in early

(R.322, 385).

Mrs. Pennington's employment changed to

part-time in February of 1969 (R.311).

She worked one day a

week in the office in Appellant's home (R.314).

She worked on

this basis until she quit in March of 1975 (R.315).

From 1969

to 1975 she did not generally make out the checks to the client,
but she did post the receipts, make some of the bank deposits,
etc.

She quit issuing the check to the client, because she

no longer knew the fee arrangement (R.319), and others might
already have done it (R.334).

After Appellant moved to his

home other people made deposits, but the receipt was attached
to the deposit slip (R.333).

She maintained a ledger card on

the Emarine account (R.335).

When she made the check out to

the client, she left all three copies of the check and voucher
together for ten days, to let the check clear (R.340).

She

would get Appellant to sign the check, would file the copies and
send out the original check.

She would post the transaction

twice a month (R.337).
Mrs. Emarine's name, at the time of the divorce was
Belcher (Ex.40).

The checks that Appellant collected were

written by Mr. Belcher and sent to the County Clerk beginning
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(H.41).

hpp::llanl pickc·c1 them ur anc1 had a

ot attor:icy so that he COL'lcl cash them (!\.41),
cnnrPl led checks issued by Mr.

pow~r

l·lciny ol' the

;lelcher \\'ere obtained, as

r:oted below, after t'.1is disjJul" orose, <.me they are in evic1encr
(R. 50-53).

On the backs of m,rny of those ch2cks are bank stamps

indicating the deposit to the account of Robert B. Hansen.
A question was asked during the hearings as to whether or not
these had in fact gone into his legal account, rather than the
trust account.

It was explained that some of his part-time

help had apparently used lhe wrong bank stamp, but that the
deposit slip which accomponied the check was for the trust
account, and the checks had gone into the correct account in
most instances (R.443).
dence as Ex. 57

The deposit slips were put in evi-

(R.418, 443).

The C.P.A. had gone through

the deposit slips, to determine whether or not the checks had
That

gone into the trust account or into the law account.
study reveals that the deposit slip used controlled.

Two exhibits were prepared by the C.P.A. covering the
Emarine account.
Belcher.

At the time of the divorce her name was

It later changed to Tucker, and then to Emarine,

and ledger cards and records reflect all three names

(R.335).

Ex. 56 compared the receipts maintained by the Appellant with
the ledger cards maintained by the County Clerk, and notes
that the receipts agree with the County Clerk records.

Ex.

56 shows a total of 75 checks, and all but six of them went
into the correct account.

The first one thi'lt went into tlw L'
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-29account was received 12-18-68, and the other five which went
into the law account arc the next five checks received, beginning 1-17-69, and continuing through 4-29-69.

This corres-

ponds with the time when Appellant was moving from his private
office to his home in early 1969 (R.322,385), and his adult
children started making some deposits.

Ex. 56 shows that the

receipt system indicated that a deposit should have been made
to the trust account, but the actual deposit slips show that
they were deposited to the law account.

The court will recall

that the receipt system used receipted for every check, and then
the receipt was marked with a T if the money was to go into the
trust account, and with an L if the money was to go into the
law account.

The final note on the first page of Ex. 56

states that the receipts correctly indicated that these should
have gone into the trust account, but the deposit slips were
for the law account.
tional.

There is no showing that this was inten-

There is an affirmative showing that the time corres-

ponds with his move

from his downtown office to his home,

where his children were just starting to make deposits (R.
385-6).

Further, the deposit caused no problem.

Ex. 32,

which consists of six checks from Appellant to Mrs. Emarine,
shows that these funds were promptly disbursed to her.
ant also confirmed this.

Appell-

He said that all of those which went

into the lejal account went out properly (R.416).

This is

also summarized on t.x. 56.
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If this is the commingling of funds, which the llcarinci
Examiners found, we resp._·ctfully submit that the findings
should have specifically addressed what happened.

We think

that the uncontroverted record showed that the l\.ppellant had
a bookeeping system set up by a firm of certified public
accountants (R.381), that the system always has included a
law firm account and a separate trust account

(R.328).

When

the money was received, a receit•l was prepared in a receipt
book (R. 325), and the receipt book was

marl~ed

with a T or with

an L, to indicate which account the funds should be deposited
in (R.311).

Great numbers of checks were handled, and even on

the Belcher-Tucker-Emarine account, al

of the checks except

six went into the trust account (Exs. 56,57), and the six
which were erroneously deposited into the law firm account
were deposited during the same general period, which coincided
with the Appellant closing his downtown office and moving into
his home (R.385), where his children began to help with the
deposits (R.385-6).

All of these checks which miscarried into

the law account were disbursed, and no mischief was caused
thereby (R.416).

There is a technical violation of the Code of

Professional Conduct on comingling, but the circumstances under
which this occurred do not, we respectfully urge, warrant a
suspension from the practice of law.
At this point, in the interest of continuity, we deem it
advisable to note two other exhibits.

One is Ex.

47 covering

37 collections made from Leslie Booth on behalf of Franklin
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-31Life-Lowrys, and Ex. 59, which covers some disbursements to
Lowry and disbursements to Winona Belcher, Tucker, Emarine.
On the 37 collections made from Booth for the benefit of
Franklin Life-Lowrys, none are shown to have been deposited
otherwise than to the trust account.

On Ex. 59, showing the

disbursements to Lowry and Emarine, all of the disbursements
are from the trust account, except one in March of 1967.
Whether or not this is another isolated check which got into the
law account is not explained by the evidence.
Thus, the Appellant had a system which included a separate
trust account for his client's funas, and the trust account was
being consistently used.

The six deposits by someone while he

was moving from his off ice downtown to his home are exceptions
to the ongoing practice, and in every case, except possibly
one, disbursement was promptly made to the client.
The conclusionary finding of the Hearing Examiners in
paragraph 5 (i) to the effect that he failed to keep the Emarine
monies in a separate trust account is thus misleading.
He did ultimately close his trust account, in the belief
that the funds remaining in it were his (R.416, 292).
There is a finding, ilo. 5 (d), that Appellant failed to
maintain complete and adequate records of the funds he collected
for Mrs. Emarine. That finding does not reflect what the
record shows.

Mrs. Pennington testified that she did maintain

ledger cards under the names

Belcher, Tucker and Emarine

(R.335), and there simply isn't any evidence that the bookeeping
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-32when Appellant moved to his home and ultimately went into a
career practice with the State and stopped the private practic 0
of law, his records were in cardboard boxes some 40 to 50 in
number (R.388) and he could not find her ledger card
402).

(R.389,

There was no effort on his part to conceal the amount of

money collected.
(Ex.12).
400-402).

He prepared an affidavit in December of 1974

He got the information from the County Clerk (R.4tJ,
He sent the affidavit to Mrs. Emarine, and from it

she discovered that the records showed payments she hadn't
received (R.42-44).

She was living in Hawaii, and was about to

come back to Utah, and so she waited until she returned to
Salt Lake (R.46).

She had received the money from 1966 to

July of 1969 (R. 41), by which later date he had closed his offic
She hadn't heard from Appellant between 1969 and 1974, but she
did receive a letter in 1974 (Ex.42) which enclosed the affidavit (Ex.12) reciting the monies received.

Ap?ellant told

her that the figure came from the court, and she inquired as
to who got the money (R.44), and he didn't answer (R.46).

\'/hen

she came back to Utah in July of 197 5, she called several times.
She testified that he put her off, saying that he would hdVC
to have time to check his records (R.47).

When she got here,

she tried to get an accounting but Appellant could not readily
get into his books--and this is far different from the charge
in the finding, that he did not maintain books.

Mrs.

Penningt~

testified that she made a ledger card under all those names-Belcher, Tucker and I:marine (R. 335), and Appel] ant testifircl
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-33he did not prepare and maintain them (R.413).

He did get the

county records (R.44), but he was not sure all of the checks
had cleared, and had the impression (which turned out to be
wrong) that some had not (R.415).

On August 12, 1975, he wrote

attempting to get Mr. Belcher's checks so that he could find
out the amount of money he owed (Ex.16).

He wrote to Mrs.

Emarine on March 3, 1975, and sent her a copy of the court's
records of payments made, and told her his records were not
readily accessible

(Ex.14).

She got Attorney Quentin Alson to

assist, and paid him a $100 retainer (R.58,65).

The newspaper

reporter called Appellant, and said that Mrs. Emarine had complained at having to pay two attorneys, and Appellant voluntarily
paid the $100 retainer to Mr. Alston (R.404).
the election campaign.
records.

This was during

As noted, Appellant could not find his

He wrote to Mr. Belcher, to try to get the checks,

went to the bank to look at microfilms, he went to the Clerk's
office to check the records, he hired Mrs. Pennington, to try
to find the records, he searched for them himself, and hired a
CPA to review the records, but could not readily find the records
he needed.

There is no evidence to contradict his testimony

and that of Mrs. Pennington that records were kept but because
he had closed his office and put his records in boxes that
could not be found.
an accounting.

He did not deny that he had a duty to render

He just could not find his records.

As the

checks of Mr. Belcher were found and the account was reconstructed, he promptly paid.

As Mr. Belcher's checks were

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-34gradually located, Mr. Alston identified preliminarily some
monies he thought were due, and Appellant promptly paid them,
after deducting his fee for collection (R.72-3).

Mr. Alston

then got further evidence that more money was due, and reque:otea
payment of $1,285.
(Ex. 22, R.81).

This request was made September 16, 1976

Appellant deposited that amount with the Clerk

of the Court on September 27th (Ex.2G, R.82).
got addition al Belcher checks
ly paid the additional money

Mrs. Emarine

(Ex. 30) and again Appellant prompt-'
(R.8G) and the account was fully

settled (R.119,121).
Appellant testified that he was not aware that money was
being received and that it was not being disbursed (R.382,393).
He also did not respond as quickly as he should have to the
requests of the clients that he straighten out their accounts
and pay the money he owed, but the record does not disclose any
willful or intentional withholding of their money.

To the

extent the funds were deposited in his le;al account--and this
rarely occurred and then only on the Emarine account--it was
inadvertent and caused no harm (R.416).

To the extent that he

was not aware that the funds had come in and not been disbursed
(R.392) he is careless, but this does not warrant a one year
suspension.
Appellant was entitled to an unequivocal finding on this
Count that he maintained complete and adequate records and

th~

the monies paid for Mrs. Emarine's benefit were deposited in a
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trust account except for 6 payments which, although placed in
a legal account, were promptly and properly paid to the client.
The findings, dealing with a single set of facts, determined that failing to pay over money to the client not only constituted a violation of the bar canons but also was a criminal violation of 78-51-42 UCA.

The bar has no jurisdiction to

determine a misdemeanor and certainly the bar proceeding held
in

this case did not afford the Appellant the safeguards

traditionally allowed in a criminal proceeding.
Appellant was also entitled to a finding that although he
Jid not pay over some of the

paym~nts

due the client promptly

and was not able to render an accounting upon immediate demand,
it was not a willful withholding and the seriousness of the
offense was mitigated because:
(1) Appellant moved more than a 20 year collection of
records from his private office to his home because of his acceptance of the public practice of law with the Attorney General's
off ice and a particular record was not thereafter readily
accessible.
(2) He reduced his professional clerical help because of
this change in status.
(3)

The account was an old one, continuing for a period

from a point in time more than 15 years from the date of charge
to 3 years before the charge, making more difficult the
retention and retrieval of records.
(4) He was in the midst of an election campaign when the
accounting was demanded and had precommitted excessive demands
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on his time.
(5) When he was unable to locate his own records, he exert
reasonable efforts to reconstruct the account.
(6) lie promtitly paid all sums the reconstructed accountinc:
showed due.
In numerous cases it has been held or recognized that
absence of a fraudulent or evil inttcnt is a mitigating circumstance which should be taktcn into consideration in determining
the extent of the discipline imposed.

Sec the collection of

cases in 96 ALR 2d 857 §19.
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POHJT IV.

COUNT ONE OF C0:-1PLAINT: FRAIJKLIN LIFE-LO\'IRY
MATTEH. THE FINDINGS ARE MISLEADING IN CONCLUDING APPELLANT DID NOT MAINTAIN COMPLETE AND
ADEQUATE RECORDS, AND DID NOT MAINTAIN THE
FUNDS IN A SEPARATE TRUST ACCOUNT.
THEY ARE
ERRONEOUS IN CONCLUDJ;-<G APPELLANT WAS GUILTY
OF NEGLECT, AND IN CONCLUDING A CRIMINAL
VIOLATION, AND INADEQUATE IN NOT SETTING
OUT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

(a) The Charge.

On this matter, Appellant is charged in

almost identical language as in the Emarine case--with commingling funds, not keeping adequate records, not notifying the
client of the receipt of money, and not disbursing promptly.
The canons of ethics are those as set forth above on the Emarine
matter.
On this matter, he is also charged with not completing his
work, which involved trying to make a collection from a Mr.
Gardner and a Mr. Boothe.
(b) Evidence.

The evidence in regard to the accounting

records kept and the manner of depositing client's funds, ineluding the Lowry funds, is detailed above.
a trust account.
ledger cards.

Appellant did have

He did have an accounting system with client

He did keep receipt books.

The receipts were

posted and the money was disbursed, all as is detailed in the
Emarine Count.
In paragraph 4(g) of the Findings, the Hearing Examiners
concluded that Appellant failed to maintain the funds collected
for Franklin Life-Lowry in a separate trust account, and commingling the same with his own funds.

We do not believe that

this finding is in accord with the evidence.

Part of the funds
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-37collected came from one Leslie L. Boothe.
tion of 37 payments made by Boothe.

Ex.47 is a eompila-

None of these appear to

have been deposited to the legal account.
Ex. 59 shows 11 disbursements by the Appellant to Lowry, ar.
all 11 of those checks were drclwn on tlw trust account.

We

don't believe that there is any exhibit or any testimony showin
that the Franklin Life-Lowry money was commingled.

It is true

that sometime after Appellant closed his law offices, moved his
files into his home, and went to work full time for the Attorne;
General's office, he assumed that the money remaining in the
trust account was his own (R.292), and he drew the money out ar
used it, but that is not the commingling charged in the complaint, nor covered by the findings.
The Hearing Examiners also found

(Finding 4(c)) that

Appellant failed to maintain complete and adequate records of
the funds to be collected.

Again, we do not believe that this

finding is supported by the evidence.
Appellant,as detailed above in the Emarine Count,

testifi~

that the beekeeping system he was using was set up by a firm
of certified public accountants

(R.381).

When the money came

in, a receipt was written therefor (R.302,391-2).

Mrs.

Pennin~

ton, who did the in-house beekeeping, testified about the systc
(R.306,330), and there is no dispute about the fact that the
Appellant always maintained a trust account with its own check!
and its own deposit slips and a legal account with separate
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-38checks and separate deposit slips (R.306,326,328,391).

The

trust account had been maintained for more than 20 years (R.
391,325).

After the receipt was written Mrs. Pennington posted

the receipt to client ledger cards (R.306).

She, at that time,

(R.336) advised the client of the receipt of the money and that
it would be disbursed within about ten days, when the check had
cleared.

She also at that time

wrot~

the check to the client,

but held the check itself and the vouchers (copies) for approximately ten days.

When the check cleared, the funds were dis-

bursed to the client (R.336).
to 1969

(R.315).

The system worked well from 1964

The money went in the correct accounts, and

the checks disbursing the money were sent to the clients (R.
315).

The receipt book was marked with a T to indicate that

the check should be deposited to the trust account and with an
L to indicate that it should be deposited to the legal account
(R.306).

The receipt books were posted to the client ledger

cards about twice a month (R.329,337).

Mrs. Pennington did

testify that one of the Lowry ledger cards was incomplete, but
she also said that there may have been a card under Franklin
Life (the original client for whom suit was filed) R.247, Ex.8),
and that she may have completed the Lowry card from the Franklin
sheet (R.346).

This does not prove the records were not kept.

We respectfully submit that the Appellant had an adequate
accounting system.

However, when he moved from his downtown

office to his home and started to work on a

full-tim~

basis in

the Attorney General's office, the system broke down.
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-39His longtime secretary and bookeeµer worked only a six hoc
day, once a week (R.327).

She posted the receipts to the cus-

tomer's ledger card (R.327), but she no longer assumed the responsibility of notifying the client that the money had been
received.

She further discontinued issuing the checks,

becaus~

she no longer knew the amount of the attorney fee, and did not
know whether someone else had already issued the check (R.334).
The result was that funds were µaid and deposited by his µarttime help (R. 385).

Appellant admitedly should have, but did nc'

follow the matter to the extent of knowing that the money was
being received and that it was not being disbursed

(R.276,392).

On the Lowry matter it is clear that the initial client
was an insurance company--Franklin Life.

The complaints

again~

Messrs. Gardner and Boothe were filed in the name of Franklin
Life (Exs. 8 & 9 for the two Gardner suits and Ex.
complaint in the Boothe suit).

52 for the

Mr. Lowry was the agent for

Franklin Life, and he asked Appellant to pay the money to him.
Appellant considered Franklin Life to be the client, Lowry to
be the agent, and he obeyed the instructions.

Appellant simply

assumed that this was agreeable with Franklin Life

(R.382-4).

Some of the checks were made payable to Mr. Lowry, and after hr
died other checks were made payable to Mrs. Lowry (see, for
example, Ex. 59).

However, Mrs. Lowry herself testified that

she had never talked to or received a letter from the Appellant
(R.20) and technically the attorney-client relationship was

never established between the Appellant and Mrs. Lowry as an
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(R.

-40275).

She did become executor of the James E. Lowry estate

(R.18) and she did by letter (Ex.4) request an accounting.
The letter is dated March 4, 1971.

The original of this letter

was introduced as Ex. 55, and on the bottom of it is a notation
from Appellant to his secretary which he said was intended to
have the secretary follow through on it (R.393).
appears to be dated May 8th.
(R.25).

His notation

Mrs. Lowry did get a ledger card

This was attached to a letter of July 1, 1976, in which

Appellant indicates that he had collected $449.08 on the Leslie
Boothe account, and that the check represented the balance due.
(R.25).

He also offered to pay 50% of the amount still due

from Gardner--not because he had guaranteed (R.29) that he could
nake the collection, but because she had complained that he had
not properly pursued the work (R.26,30).
pay which she declined.

Ex.7 is the offer to

She was asked on cross-examination if

the $162.72 that Appellant tendered was not the correct balance,
and she said she didn't know (R.31).
accounting and did not get it (R.37).

Her son also requested an
Appellant testified that

he filed the suits for Franklin Life (R.377); that the money
collected from Boothe also reduced the Gardner debt (R.378); that
he moved to his home and put the records in boxes (R.377-8);
that he could not find the records nor his file on the Gardner
lawsuit.

He however, had finally located it in a vertical file

in his furnace room the Saturday before the hearing (R.388).
He describes the extent of his search in an effort to get the
recorJs (R.389), a11d that he did not know the money was not
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-41he thought Mrs. Pennington had obtained and sent the requestcJ
information (R.393).

He could not find all the Franklin Life

ledger cards (R.394).

He tendered $162.72 principal and $81

in interest, which he got from part of the ledger cards which
he was able to find, going forward from 1967

(R.394).

He

unequivocally testified that every cent of the Franklin LifeLowry money went into the trust account, "I know it did,"
(R.392).

He was requested to turn the file over to another

attorney if he was too busy.
could handle it,

b~t

He testified that he thought he

another reason he didn't turn it over to

another attorney is that he coulc1n' t

find the file

(R. 398).

He

also testified that one of the Lowry letters which was sent to
him was recently found unopened, and he didn't know why (R.
421).

He also testified that when he met with the Bar on Mrs.

Lawry's complaint, the Bar told him to get her the best

inform~

tion "you have got available, and see if you can't satisfy
her."

It was after that that he made the tender of the settle-

ment check to her (R.424).
We believe there is a technical defense to the Franklin
Life-Lowry charge.

The client was Franklin Life.

Mr. Lowry

was its agent and upon his death the agency relationship terminated.

There is no showing that Mrs. Lowry was an agent of

Franklin Life.

The evidence involved Appellant's failure to

account to and pay over to Mrs. Lowry.
We believe there are two technical defenses to the neglec:
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charge in the Lowry matter.

The last activity in the Franklin

Life-Lowry matter occurred in 1966 (Ex.59).
was filed with the Bar Commission in 1977.

The complaint
If the 3 year

statute of limitations as prescribed by the Bar in Rule 10 of
the Rules of Discipline, amended February 9, 1977, is to be
meaningful, it must preclude an 11 year lapse between the last
activity in the matter on which a neglect charge is claimed
and the bringing of a complainL.

As a second technical defense

to the neglect charge, the Am0rican Bar Association issued
informal opinion No. 1273 in 1973, which holds that the word
"neglect" means a pattern of inaction and does not include a
single instance of neglect no matter how gross.

It states:

"Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure
to carry out the obligations which the lawyer has assumed
to his client, or a conscious disregard for the responsibility owed to the client.
The concept of ordinary
negligence is different.
Neglect usually involves more
than a single act or omission. Neglect cannot be found
if the acts or omissions complained of were inadvertent
or the result of an error of judgment made in good
faith."
In other words, a lawyer is not guilty of neglect unless he
knows he is performing incompetently or knows that he ought to
be performing when he isn't.
Appellant was entitled to an unequivocal finding on this
count, as in the Emarine count, that he maintained complete and
adequate records and that the monies paid for Franklin LifeLowry's benefit were deposited in a trust account.
Appelllant was also entitled to a finding that although he
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-43did not pay over the sum of money due Franklir1 Life promptly
and was not able to render an accounting upon immediate demand,
it was not a willful withholding and the seriousness of the
offense was mitigated because

(1) Appellant moved more than

a 20 year collection of records from his private office to his
home because of his acceptanct' of the public practice of law
with the Attorney General's office and a particular record was
not thereafter readily acccssiulc,

(2)

he reduced his profcssio:

al clerical help because of this chancrc in status,

( 3) the

account was an old one which had been inactive since 1966,
making more difficult the retention and retrieval of records,
(4) he was in the midst of an election campaign when the
accounting was demanded and had precommitted excessive demands
on his time,

(5) when he located the Franklin Life ledger card,

he sent a copy of it to the client and promptly paid the sums
the accounting showed were due,

(6) he followed the counsel of

the Bar Commission in determining as best he could the amount
due and making prompt settlement thereof, and

(7) he went the

extra mile and tendered half of the balance due from an account
that would ordinarily have been written off as a bad debt.
The Franklin Life-Lowry claim, as with the Emarine claim,
is one in which there is a complete absence of fraudulent
or evil intent.

That fact should have been taken into account

as a mitigating circumstance in determining the extent of the
discipline imposed.

Sec the collection of cases in 96 ALR 2d

852, §19.
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THL PINDI~GS ARE ERRO~LOUS IN CONCLUDI~G THE ATTORNEY
GE:n:R;\L IS SUDJEC'1' TO l'RECLUSIO'.' BY TllE BAR FROM
PRACTICE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.
The office of Attorney General is, in Utah, an office
established by the Constitution.

The qualifications and duties

of office are described by the Constitution.

See Constitution

of Utah, Article VII, Sections 1, 3 and 18.
The Constitution provides a method for removal of the
Attorney General from his office.

See Article 6, Sections 17,

18 and 19.
When an office such as the Attorney General, which is
mandated by the Constitution, is coupled with a Constitutional
provision for removal from office, it has traditionally been
held to mean that the Constitutional method for removal is the
exclusive method of removal.

See 63 AmJur 2d Public Officers

and Employees, §178 and the cases cited in footnote 65.

The

Utah Constitution and the Utah Statutes provide that the Attorney General shall practice law in the official capacity as
Attorney General.

See Utah Constitution, Article VII, §18

and 67-5-1 UCA 1953 as amended.
If the Bar, through disciplinary proceedings precludes
his right to practice law, the Bar through its disciplinary
proceedings thereby interferes with his Constitutional duties
as Attorney General.

To exercise disciplinary sanction beyond

that of a reprimand is tantamount to impeachment and hence
by indirection a circumvention of the Utah Constitution and
unlawful interference with the exclusive constitutional
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-45The Constitution ancl t11e statutes enlarging the Constitutional duties of the Attorney General impose upon the
Attorney General duties j ncow3istent with certain of the canoe.
of ethics enjoined upon

m~mbcrs

of the Bar.

For instance,

Canon 5 forbids an attorney to represent a party when the
attorney has a conflict of interest with
party.

re~;pccl

to another

The Attorney General, by Constitution and statute,

must represent all of the Utah officers and their agenc.i.es.
Many times there are confJjcts of interest among Utah agencies
Is the Attorney General subject to suspension for violating
this canon?
If the Bar through its disciplinary proceedings can

rerno~

the Attorney General, it can through this means deprive the
people of tneir voice in the selection of a strong and
Attorney General.

vigoro.~,

The only two cases that have dealt directly

with this issue have determined that misconduct of a District
Attorney when he is elected and subject to constitutional
removal procedures can be addressed only through impeachment
proceedings outlined in the State Constitution.

Simpson v

Alabama State Bar, 311 S.2d 307; l'/atson v Alabama, 311 S.2d 31
For a more elaborate statement of this point, see Appellant's
Memorandum which is a part of the trial record.
CONCLUSIOl-J
In the Dick case, the Bar should have unequivocally made
findings absolving Appellant from all wrong doing and not
equivocated in the findings so as to cast

et

suspicion on tllt
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propriety of his actions in the matter contained in the count.
In the Piepenburg count, the Bar should have found him innocent
of any violation of the canons.

In the Emerine and Lowry

counts the Bar should have found that he maintained complete
and adequate records, that he was innocent of commingling of
funds as charged but that he misplaced the records and was not
thereby able to reasonably make payment of any owed sums upon
demand or to render a timely accounting.

The findings should

have contained the mitigating circumstances that Appellant had
recently moved his more than 20 years records from his private
office to his home, had significantly reduced his clerical
help because of this change in status, was in the midst of an
election campaign when the accounting was demanded and had
precommitted excessive demands on his time, the records needed
to render the accounting extended over more than 10 years
each, when he was unable to locate his own records, he exercised
reasonable efforts to reconstruct the accounting and promptly
paid all sums owned under the reconstructed accounting.

In

addition, in the Franklin Life-Lowry matters, the findings
should have completely absolved him on the neglect charge.
The Legislature has placed on the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court has accepted the fact that:
"\\Te do not consider the recommendations of punishment
made by the Bar to be in the same category as we do their
findings of fact, because it is our responsibility to
discipline an erring attorney, and we cannot de~egate
that duty to others.
The Utah State Bar makes its
recommendations upon a reading of the printed record of
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-47proceedings had before committees and not before the
individual commissioners of the State Bar.
hie arc,
therefore, in an equally good position to evaluate the
situation as are the commissioners." In re George
Bridwell, Disciplinary_Pr_oceeding, 474 P.2d 116. -In this case, the Bar Commissioners never even had
before them a transcript of the proceedings but only the conclusionary report of the llearing Examiners which they adopted
in total.

We submit a readinu of the record in this case

does not warrant a suspension from the practice.
Dated this 17th day of April, 1978.

Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

